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1. FOR YOUR USE IN EVALUATING VC INFLUENCE ON THE DZU VOTE, HERE IS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM OUR FIELD REPRESENTATIVES ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. THE ONLY DIRECT EVIDENCE FROM AN NVA/VC SOURCE WAS PROVIDED BY [redacted] WHO DEFECTED IN [redacted] SAID THAT HE RECEIVED AN ORDER ON AUG 25 FROM THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE, REGION VI, DIRECTING

ALL CADRE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ACTIVITY TO SABOTAGE THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS TO URGE THE PEOPLE UNDER VC INFLUENCE TO VOTE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE TRUONG DINH DZU. [redacted] SAID THAT THE ORDER TO SUPPORT DZU HAD BEEN MADE BECAUSE OF DZU'S WISH TO FOLLOW THE ROAD OF PEACE AND NEUTRALITY AND

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HIS WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN TALKS WITH THE NLF. ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE ORDER TO SUPPORT DZU WAS A GENERAL ONE--

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THAT IS TO SAY, IT WAS ISSUED ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY TO ENSURE THAT THE PEOPLE IN FACT DID VOTE FOR DZU (COMMENT IN BINH THUAN PROVINCE, 60 PERCENT OF THE VOTERS DID NOTE FOR DZU). ASKED IF DZU HAD ANY RELATIONS WITH THE VC, [redacted] REPLIED THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW.

3. ADDITIONALLY, THERE IS THE FOLLOWING OTHER UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION REPORTED IN VARIOUS PROVINCES:

A. IN TAY NINH PROVINCE (III CORPS), THE VC PROPAGANDIZED THE DZU TICKET, TELLING THE PEOPLE A CIVTORY BY DZU WOULD BRING ABOUT PEACE. IT WAS ALSO REPORTED THAT THE VC REQUIRED AN UNUSED THIEU/KY BALLOT AS A TICKET FOR SAFE PASSAGE THROUGH VC LINES AFTER THE PEOPLE HAD VOTED.

B. IN KIEN HOA PROVINCE (IV CORPS), THE VC CADRE VISITED VILLAGES AND HAMLETS IN BA TRI AND MO CAY DISTRICTS AT NIGHT AND INSTRUCTED THE PEOPLE TO VOTE FOR DZU FOR PRESIDENT AND FOR UPPER HOUSE LIST 21 HEADED BY NGUYEN NGOC KY. DURING THE SEVEN DAYS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE

ELECTIONS THE CADRE DISTRIBUTED MONEY AND TOLD THE PEOPLE THAT ONLY DZU AND KY COULD BRING PEACE TO THE COUNTRY, AND THAT THE MILITARY CANDIDATED WANTED THE WAR TO CONTINUE.

C. IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE (IV CORPS), THE VC TOLD THE PEOPLE OF BEN TRANH AND GIAO DUC DISTRICTS TO VOTE FOR DZU AS HIS CAMPAIGN PLATFORM WOULD LEAD TO SELF-DETERMINATION BY THE PEOPLE. THE VC SAID THAT DZU WAS THE STAUNCHEST OPPONENT OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THAT IF HE WERE ELECTED HE WOULD RECOGNIZE THE NLF AS A VIABLE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. IN CAO DAI AREAS OF DINH TUONG, THE VC USED THREATENING TACTICS RATHER THAN PERSUASION. THEY TOLD THE PEOPLE TO VOTE FOR DZU OR NOT VOTE AT ALL, AND THREATENED VIOLENCE IF INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT OBEYED.

D. IN KIEN PHONG PROVINCE (IV CORPS), THE VC

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ISSUED ORDERS TO THE PEOPLE IN HONG NGU DISTRICT TO VOTE FOR DZU BECAUSE THE CENTRAL POINT OF HIS PLATFORM, LIKE THAT OF THE NLF PROGRAM, WAS FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE VC SAID THAT DZU DOES NOT CONSIDER THE NLF TO BE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED, BUT AN ASSEMBLY OF NATIONALISTS WHO

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RESIST MILITARY DICTATORSHIP. AFTER THE ELECTIONS, THE VC CONGRATULATED THE PEOPLE FOR BEING A "PROGRESSIVE ELEMENT" (DZU CAME IN FIRST IN KIEN PHONG PROVINCE).

E. IN VINH LONG PROVINCE (IV CORPS), THE VC URGED SUPPORT FOR DZU BECAUSE A VOTE FOR DZU WAS A VOTE FOR PEACE.

F. IN KIEN GIANG AND CHUONG THIEN PROVINCES (IV CORPS), THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF VC SUPPORT FOR DZU. IN VINH BINH PROVINCE (IV CORPS), THERE WERE REPORTS EARLY IN AUG THAT THE VC WERE URGING THE PEOPLE TO VOTE FOR A NEUTRALIST OR MODERATE TICKET RATHER THAN THE TICKET OF THIEU AND KY.

4. A CAPTURED VC DOCUMENT [redacted] FROM GIA DINH SUGGESTED AN INTERESTING AMBIVALENCE ON THE PART OF THE VC TOWARD THE ELECTIONS. WHILE THE LETTER URGES CADRE TO HAVE PEOPLE UNDER THEIR CONTROL BOYCOTT THE ELECTIONS, THE CADRE COULD, ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL SITUATION, "COORDINATE THE STRUGGLES OF VARIOUS AREAS, LAY BARE THE ENEMY FARCICAL GAME, DRIVE THE CANDIDATES INTO DEADLOCK, ALIENATE THE CANDIDATES FROM EACH OTHER,

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AND ESPECIALLY ISOLATE THIEU/KY." THIS LETTER SUGGESTS THAT LOCAL VC LEADERSHIP WAS LEFT THE OPTION OF SUPPORTING A TICKET OPPOSED TO THE THIEU AND KY TICKET IF THE LEADERSHIP SAW POLITICAL GAINS TO BE THEREBY ATTAINED.

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5. IT APPEARS CLEAR THAT VC URGED PEOPLE TO VOTE FOR DZU IN MANY PARTS OF VIET-NAM. IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THIS WAS PURSUANT TO A GENERAL CBVN DIRECTIVE OR OCCURRED ALL OVER THE COUNTRY (ALTHOUGH [redacted] BELIEVES THAT IT WAS DIRECT ORDER FROM HANOI). WE CANNOT EVALUATE HOW MUCH OF DZU'S VOTE WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO VC INFLUENCE OR INTIMIDATION AND HOW MUCH WAS DUE TO HIS CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION, TAN DAI VIET SUPPORT, OR EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN PLATFORM AND STYLE.

GP-3. BUNKER

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